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By Tom Elia
July 18, 2004
The New Editor
The war with terrorism will clearly be a crucial, if not the most important issue in the
upcoming 2004 presidential election. And while it's inevitable that most attention will be
focused on evaluating current polling data in order to predict the winner, studying past
history might prove to be a more useful predictor.
A comparison of today's political situation with that of the early 19th century provides some
interesting parallels (and contrasts) with today's political environment, and may well provide
some clues about who might win the 2004 presidential election.
Arguably, the Democratic Party's current position with respect to the war on terrorism and
the war with Iraq (which might best be described as a battle within the war on terrorism)
provides many similarities to that of the Federalist Party's position relative to the War of
1812.
As with today's struggle against terrorism perpetrated by fundamentalist Islamists, the US
was plagued during the late 18th and early 19th centuries with the aggressive military actions
of both France and England, who, in the course of fighting each other, were at separate
times busy blockading or attacking US trans-Atlantic commerce, or engaging in the
impressment of US sailors.
Similarly, the 20-year time span during which terrorism has been afflicting us today was
roughly the same amount of time the earlier issue had been facing late 18th and early 19th
century America. One of the central issues of that period was: should the US go to war with,
at one time the French, or at another time the British, over the disruption of US trans-Atlantic
commerce?
After the American Revolution, both the Washington and Adams Administrations tried to
keep the US out of a war with England or France -- primarily because they believed the US
would be at a tactical disadvantage in a war with either country. Likewise in the 20th
century, Presidents Reagan and Clinton made similar calculations with regard to combating
terrorism -- delaying a fight because they recognized the US' inherent tactical disadvantage in
a possible military confrontation with terrorists and their supporting states.
The question of how to confront this militaristic interruption of US trade continued through
the Jefferson Administration, overlapping into James Madison's presidency, when the US
finally declared war on the British over the issue in 1812.
The War of 1812, like the current war on terrorism, was extremely divisive; the declaration
of war passed by margins in Congress that could only be described as depicting less than a
solid front of support -- only 79 to 49 in the House and 19 to 13 in the Senate. Then, as
now, most of that war's opponents resided in one political party: 19th century Federalists
then, and 21st century Democrats now.
Like today's war on terrorism, the War of 1812 was marked by political disagreement
regarding its reasons and goals. The War Hawks pointed to US sovereignty and security
interests as reasons for the war. Like some of today's anti-war critics, yesterday's 19th
century anti-war critics argued that the Hawks, mostly from the South and West, were
driving the prosecution of the war for expansionist purposes. Opposition to the war was so
severe in some instances that New England -- then the wealthiest section of the country, and
ironically the most affected by the disruption of trans-Atlantic commerce before the war --
withheld both troops and money from the government in protest of "Mr. Madison's War."
Today's opposition to the war on terrorism has taken a different form than those of the 19th
century New Englanders. Instead, today's war opposition is dominated by vigorous efforts at
discrediting President Bush and the war's proponents as not simply wrong or misguided, but
as liars, extreme radicals, or greed-driven, corporate puppets acting against US national
interests.
Unlike today, during the War of 1812 the US clearly fielded the inferior military force. From
the beginning, winning the war on the high seas was a hopeless task for the US, with the US
Navy being completely outgunned by the British Navy. On land, the results were not quite as
one-sided, but were not resounding victories for the US (some early battles were lost as a
result of the refusal of New England militias to engage the British). Unlike today's war with
Iraq, US attempts to defeat the British by invading Canada were repulsed. Battles in this
campaign were fought in places like Chicago, Detroit, Toronto, and Montreal; Washington,
DC was invaded and President Madison forced to flee the capitol; a pivotal battle was fought
at Baltimore; and one famous battle was fought -- after the war -- at New Orleans.
Like the War of 1812, there has been bloodshed on US soil in the war on terrorism -- and
there is unfortunately too large a probability that there will be more. Thus far, both the war
on terrorism and the battle in Iraq, while achieving far from perfect results, have arguably
achieved more successes than those from that war two centuries past.
Despite all of this -- the debate over the goals of the War of 1812, the political opposition at
home, the early lack of military success, etc. -- Madison's political heir and Secretary of
State James Monroe coasted to victory in 1816 over Federalist candidate Sen. Rufus King of
New York, winning about 85% of the Electoral College vote.
That election marked the beginning of the end of the Federalist Party, with a new coalition
eventually replacing it.
These comparisons to the War of 1812 are not meant as a prediction of an electoral wipeout
in favor of Bush and the Republicans in 2004, nor are they meant as a prediction of the end
of the Democratic Party, but rather, as a prediction that a drastic redrawing of the
Democratic Party's coalition might be the result of the current debate.
If history provides any guide, such a reordering may be more possible than any poll -- or
pundit -- may be willing to predict.
Tom Elia is a contributing editor for The New Editor.
Paul Geary
David Rogers